This module provides SSL v2/v3 and TLS v1 support for the Apache
HTTP Server. It was contributed by Ralf S. Engeschall based on his
mod_ssl project and originally derived from work by Ben Laurie.
This module relies on OpenSSL
to provide the cryptography engine.
Further details, discussion, and examples are provided in the
SSL documentation.
This module provides a lot of SSL information as additional environment
variables to the SSI and CGI namespace. The generated variables are listed in
the table below. For backward compatibility the information can
be made available under different names, too. Look in the Compatibility chapter for details on the
compatibility variables.
When mod_ssl is built into Apache or at least
loaded (under DSO situation) additional functions exist for the Custom Log Format of
mod_log_config. First there is an
additional ``%{varname}x''
eXtension format function which can be used to expand any variables
provided by any module, especially those provided by mod_ssl which can
you find in the above table.
For backward compatibility there is additionally a special
``%{name}c'' cryptography format function
provided. Information about this function is provided in the Compatibility chapter.
This directive sets the all-in-one file where you can assemble the
Certificates of Certification Authorities (CA) whose clients you deal
with. These are used for Client Authentication. Such a file is simply the
concatenation of the various PEM-encoded Certificate files, in order of
preference. This can be used alternatively and/or additionally to
SSLCACertificatePath.
This directive sets the directory where you keep the Certificates of
Certification Authorities (CAs) whose clients you deal with. These are used to
verify the client certificate on Client Authentication.
The files in this directory have to be PEM-encoded and are accessed through
hash filenames. So usually you can't just place the Certificate files
there: you also have to create symbolic links named
hash-value.N. And you should always make sure this directory
contains the appropriate symbolic links.
This directive sets the all-in-one file where you can
assemble the Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) of Certification
Authorities (CA) whose clients you deal with. These are used
for Client Authentication. Such a file is simply the concatenation of
the various PEM-encoded CRL files, in order of preference. This can be
used alternatively and/or additionally to SSLCARevocationPath.
This directive sets the directory where you keep the Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRL) of Certification Authorities (CAs) whose clients you deal with.
These are used to revoke the client certificate on Client Authentication.
The files in this directory have to be PEM-encoded and are accessed through
hash filenames. So usually you have not only to place the CRL files there.
Additionally you have to create symbolic links named
hash-value.rN. And you should always make sure this directory
contains the appropriate symbolic links.
This directive sets the optional all-in-one file where you can
assemble the certificates of Certification Authorities (CA) which form the
certificate chain of the server certificate. This starts with the issuing CA
certificate of of the server certificate and can range up to the root CA
certificate. Such a file is simply the concatenation of the various
PEM-encoded CA Certificate files, usually in certificate chain order.
This should be used alternatively and/or additionally to SSLCACertificatePath for explicitly
constructing the server certificate chain which is sent to the browser
in addition to the server certificate. It is especially useful to
avoid conflicts with CA certificates when using client
authentication. Because although placing a CA certificate of the
server certificate chain into SSLCACertificatePath has the same effect
for the certificate chain construction, it has the side-effect that
client certificates issued by this same CA certificate are also
accepted on client authentication. That's usually not one expect.
But be careful: Providing the certificate chain works only if you are using a
single (either RSA or DSA) based server certificate. If you are
using a coupled RSA+DSA certificate pair, this will work only if actually both
certificates use the same certificate chain. Else the browsers will be
confused in this situation.
This directive points to the PEM-encoded Certificate file for the server and
optionally also to the corresponding RSA or DSA Private Key file for it
(contained in the same file). If the contained Private Key is encrypted the
Pass Phrase dialog is forced at startup time. This directive can be used up to
two times (referencing different filenames) when both a RSA and a DSA based
server certificate is used in parallel.
This directive points to the PEM-encoded Private Key file for the
server. If the Private Key is not combined with the Certificate in the
SSLCertificateFile, use this additional directive to
point to the file with the stand-alone Private Key. When
SSLCertificateFile is used and the file
contains both the Certificate and the Private Key this directive need
not be used. But we strongly discourage this practice. Instead we
recommend you to separate the Certificate and the Private Key. If the
contained Private Key is encrypted, the Pass Phrase dialog is forced
at startup time. This directive can be used up to two times
(referencing different filenames) when both a RSA and a DSA based
private key is used in parallel.
This complex directive uses a colon-separated cipher-spec string
consisting of OpenSSL cipher specifications to configure the Cipher Suite the
client is permitted to negotiate in the SSL handshake phase. Notice that this
directive can be used both in per-server and per-directory context. In
per-server context it applies to the standard SSL handshake when a connection
is established. In per-directory context it forces a SSL renegotation with the
reconfigured Cipher Suite after the HTTP request was read but before the HTTP
response is sent.
An SSL cipher specification in cipher-spec is composed of 4 major
attributes plus a few extra minor ones:
Key Exchange Algorithm:
RSA or Diffie-Hellman variants.
Authentication Algorithm:
RSA, Diffie-Hellman, DSS or none.
Cipher/Encryption Algorithm:
DES, Triple-DES, RC4, RC2, IDEA or none.
MAC Digest Algorithm:
MD5, SHA or SHA1.
An SSL cipher can also be an export cipher and is either a SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1
cipher (here TLSv1 is equivalent to SSLv3). To specify which ciphers to use,
one can either specify all the Ciphers, one at a time, or use aliases to
specify the preference and order for the ciphers (see Table
1).
Ephemeral (temp.key) Diffie-Hellman key exchange (no cert)
Authentication Algorithm:
aNULL
No authentication
aRSA
RSA authentication
aDSS
DSS authentication
aDH
Diffie-Hellman authentication
Cipher Encoding Algorithm:
eNULL
No encoding
DES
DES encoding
3DES
Triple-DES encoding
RC4
RC4 encoding
RC2
RC2 encoding
IDEA
IDEA encoding
MAC Digest Algorithm:
MD5
MD5 hash function
SHA1
SHA1 hash function
SHA
SHA hash function
Aliases:
SSLv2
all SSL version 2.0 ciphers
SSLv3
all SSL version 3.0 ciphers
TLSv1
all TLS version 1.0 ciphers
EXP
all export ciphers
EXPORT40
all 40-bit export ciphers only
EXPORT56
all 56-bit export ciphers only
LOW
all low strength ciphers (no export, single DES)
MEDIUM
all ciphers with 128 bit encryption
HIGH
all ciphers using Triple-DES
RSA
all ciphers using RSA key exchange
DH
all ciphers using Diffie-Hellman key exchange
EDH
all ciphers using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange
ADH
all ciphers using Anonymous Diffie-Hellman key exchange
DSS
all ciphers using DSS authentication
NULL
all ciphers using no encryption
Now where this becomes interesting is that these can be put together
to specify the order and ciphers you wish to use. To speed this up
there are also aliases (SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1, EXP, LOW, MEDIUM,
HIGH) for certain groups of ciphers. These tags can be joined
together with prefixes to form the cipher-spec. Available
prefixes are:
none: add cipher to list
+: add ciphers to list and pull them to current location in list
-: remove cipher from list (can be added later again)
!: kill cipher from list completely (can not be added later again)
A simpler way to look at all of this is to use the ``openssl ciphers
-v'' command which provides a nice way to successively create the
correct cipher-spec string. The default cipher-spec string
is ``ALL:!ADH:RC4+RSA:+HIGH:+MEDIUM:+LOW:+SSLv2:+EXP'' which
means the following: first, remove from consideration any ciphers that do not
authenticate, i.e. for SSL only the Anonymous Diffie-Hellman ciphers. Next,
use ciphers using RC4 and RSA. Next include the high, medium and then the low
security ciphers. Finally pull all SSLv2 and export ciphers to the
end of the list.
This directive toggles the usage of the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine. This
is usually used inside a <VirtualHost> section to enable SSL/TLS for a
particular virtual host. By default the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine is
disabled for both the main server and all configured virtual hosts.
Пример
<VirtualHost _default_:443>
SSLEngine on
...
</VirtualHost>
This configures the SSL engine's semaphore (aka. lock) which is used for mutual
exclusion of operations which have to be done in a synchronized way between the
pre-forked Apache server processes. This directive can only be used in the
global server context because it's only useful to have one global mutex.
This directive is designed to closely match the
AcceptMutex directive
The following Mutex types are available:
none | no
This is the default where no Mutex is used at all. Use it at your own
risk. But because currently the Mutex is mainly used for synchronizing
write access to the SSL Session Cache you can live without it as long
as you accept a sometimes garbled Session Cache. So it's not recommended
to leave this the default. Instead configure a real Mutex.
posixsem
This is an elegant Mutex variant where a Posix Semaphore is used when possible.
It is only available when the underlying platform
and APR supports it.
sysvsem
This is a somewhat elegant Mutex variant where a SystemV IPC Semaphore is used when
possible. It is possible to "leak" SysV semaphores if processes crash before
the semaphore is removed. It is only available when the underlying platform
and APR supports it.
sem
This directive tells the SSL Module to pick the "best" semaphore implementation
available to it, choosing between Posix and SystemV IPC, in that order. It is only
available when the underlying platform and APR supports at least one of the 2.
pthread
This directive tells the SSL Module to use Posix thread mutexes. It is only available
if the underlying platform and APR supports it.
fcntl:/path/to/mutex
This is a portable Mutex variant where a physical (lock-)file and the fcntl()
fucntion are used as the Mutex.
Always use a local disk filesystem for /path/to/mutex and never a file
residing on a NFS- or AFS-filesystem. It is only available when the underlying platform
and APR supports it. Note: Internally, the Process ID (PID) of the
Apache parent process is automatically appended to
/path/to/mutex to make it unique, so you don't have to worry
about conflicts yourself. Notice that this type of mutex is not available
under the Win32 environment. There you have to use the semaphore
mutex.
flock:/path/to/mutex
This is similar to the fcntl:/path/to/mutex method with the
exception that the flock() function is used to provide file
locking. It is only available when the underlying platform
and APR supports it.
file:/path/to/mutex
This directive tells the SSL Module to pick the "best" file locking implementation
available to it, choosing between fcntl and flock,
in that order. It is only available when the underlying platform and APR supports
at least one of the 2.
default | yes
This directive tells the SSL Module to pick the default locking implementation
as determined by the platform and APR.
This directive can be used to control various run-time options on a
per-directory basis. Normally, if multiple SSLOptions
could apply to a directory, then the most specific one is taken
completely; the options are not merged. However if all the
options on the SSLOptions directive are preceded by a
plus (+) or minus (-) symbol, the options
are merged. Any options preceded by a + are added to the
options currently in force, and any options preceded by a
- are removed from the options currently in force.
The available options are:
StdEnvVars
When this option is enabled, the standard set of SSL related CGI/SSI
environment variables are created. This per default is disabled for
performance reasons, because the information extraction step is a
rather expensive operation. So one usually enables this option for
CGI and SSI requests only.
CompatEnvVars
When this option is enabled, additional CGI/SSI environment variables are
created for backward compatibility to other Apache SSL solutions. Look in
the Compatibility chapter for details
on the particular variables generated.
ExportCertData
When this option is enabled, additional CGI/SSI environment variables are
created: SSL_SERVER_CERT, SSL_CLIENT_CERT and
SSL_CLIENT_CERT_CHAINn (with n = 0,1,2,..).
These contain the PEM-encoded X.509 Certificates of server and client for
the current HTTPS connection and can be used by CGI scripts for deeper
Certificate checking. Additionally all other certificates of the client
certificate chain are provided, too. This bloats up the environment a
little bit which is why you have to use this option to enable it on
demand.
FakeBasicAuth
When this option is enabled, the Subject Distinguished Name (DN) of the
Client X509 Certificate is translated into a HTTP Basic Authorization
username. This means that the standard Apache authentication methods can
be used for access control. The user name is just the Subject of the
Client's X509 Certificate (can be determined by running OpenSSL's
openssl x509 command: openssl x509 -noout -subject -in
certificate.crt). Note that no password is
obtained from the user. Every entry in the user file needs this password:
``xxj31ZMTZzkVA'', which is the DES-encrypted version of the
word `password''. Those who live under MD5-based encryption
(for instance under FreeBSD or BSD/OS, etc.) should use the following MD5
hash of the same word: ``$1$OXLyS...$Owx8s2/m9/gfkcRVXzgoE/''.
StrictRequire
This forces forbidden access when SSLRequireSSL or
SSLRequire successfully decided that access should be
forbidden. Usually the default is that in the case where a ``Satisfy
any'' directive is used, and other access restrictions are passed,
denial of access due to SSLRequireSSL or
SSLRequire is overridden (because that's how the Apache
Satisfy mechanism should work.) But for strict access restriction
you can use SSLRequireSSL and/or SSLRequire in
combination with an ``SSLOptions +StrictRequire''. Then an
additional ``Satisfy Any'' has no chance once mod_ssl has
decided to deny access.
OptRenegotiate
This enables optimized SSL connection renegotiation handling when SSL
directives are used in per-directory context. By default a strict
scheme is enabled where every per-directory reconfiguration of
SSL parameters causes a full SSL renegotiation handshake. When this
option is used mod_ssl tries to avoid unnecessary handshakes by doing more
granular (but still safe) parameter checks. Nevertheless these granular
checks sometimes maybe not what the user expects, so enable this on a
per-directory basis only, please.
When Apache starts up it has to read the various Certificate (see
SSLCertificateFile) and
Private Key (see SSLCertificateKeyFile) files of the
SSL-enabled virtual servers. Because for security reasons the Private
Key files are usually encrypted, mod_ssl needs to query the
administrator for a Pass Phrase in order to decrypt those files. This
query can be done in two ways which can be configured by
type:
builtin
This is the default where an interactive terminal dialog occurs at startup
time just before Apache detaches from the terminal. Here the administrator
has to manually enter the Pass Phrase for each encrypted Private Key file.
Because a lot of SSL-enabled virtual hosts can be configured, the
following reuse-scheme is used to minimize the dialog: When a Private Key
file is encrypted, all known Pass Phrases (at the beginning there are
none, of course) are tried. If one of those known Pass Phrases succeeds no
dialog pops up for this particular Private Key file. If none succeeded,
another Pass Phrase is queried on the terminal and remembered for the next
round (where it perhaps can be reused).
This scheme allows mod_ssl to be maximally flexible (because for N encrypted
Private Key files you can use N different Pass Phrases - but then
you have to enter all of them, of course) while minimizing the terminal
dialog (i.e. when you use a single Pass Phrase for all N Private Key files
this Pass Phrase is queried only once).
exec:/path/to/program
Here an external program is configured which is called at startup for each
encrypted Private Key file. It is called with two arguments (the first is
of the form ``servername:portnumber'', the second is either
``RSA'' or ``DSA''), which indicate for which
server and algorithm it has to print the corresponding Pass Phrase to
stdout. The intent is that this external program first runs
security checks to make sure that the system is not compromised by an
attacker, and only when these checks were passed successfully it provides
the Pass Phrase.
Both these security checks, and the way the Pass Phrase is determined, can
be as complex as you like. Mod_ssl just defines the interface: an
executable program which provides the Pass Phrase on stdout.
Nothing more or less! So, if you're really paranoid about security, here
is your interface. Anything else has to be left as an exercise to the
administrator, because local security requirements are so different.
The reuse-algorithm above is used here, too. In other words: The external
program is called only once per unique Pass Phrase.
This directive can be used to control the SSL protocol flavors mod_ssl should
use when establishing its server environment. Clients then can only connect
with one of the provided protocols.
The available (case-insensitive) protocols are:
SSLv2
This is the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, version 2.0. It is the
original SSL protocol as designed by Netscape Corporation.
SSLv3
This is the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, version 3.0. It is the
successor to SSLv2 and the currently (as of February 1999) de-facto
standardized SSL protocol from Netscape Corporation. It's supported by
almost all popular browsers.
TLSv1
This is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, version 1.0. It is the
successor to SSLv3 and currently (as of February 1999) still under
construction by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It's still
not supported by any popular browsers.
All
This is a shortcut for ``+SSLv2 +SSLv3 +TLSv1'' and a
convinient way for enabling all protocols except one when used in
combination with the minus sign on a protocol as the example above
shows.
Пример
# enable SSLv3 and TLSv1, but not SSLv2
SSLProtocol all -SSLv2
This directive sets the all-in-one file where you can assemble the
Certificates of Certification Authorities (CA) whose remote servers you deal
with. These are used for Remote Server Authentication. Such a file is simply the
concatenation of the various PEM-encoded Certificate files, in order of
preference. This can be used alternatively and/or additionally to
SSLProxyCACertificatePath.
This directive sets the directory where you keep the Certificates of
Certification Authorities (CAs) whose remote servers you deal with. These are used to
verify the remote server certificate on Remote Server Authentication.
The files in this directory have to be PEM-encoded and are accessed through
hash filenames. So usually you can't just place the Certificate files
there: you also have to create symbolic links named
hash-value.N. And you should always make sure this directory
contains the appropriate symbolic links. Use the Makefile which
comes with mod_ssl to accomplish this task.
This directive sets the all-in-one file where you can
assemble the Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) of Certification
Authorities (CA) whose remote servers you deal with. These are used
for Remote Server Authentication. Such a file is simply the concatenation of
the various PEM-encoded CRL files, in order of preference. This can be
used alternatively and/or additionally to SSLProxyCARevocationPath.
This directive sets the directory where you keep the Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRL) of Certification Authorities (CAs) whose remote servers you deal with.
These are used to revoke the remote server certificate on Remote Server Authentication.
The files in this directory have to be PEM-encoded and are accessed through
hash filenames. So usually you have not only to place the CRL files there.
Additionally you have to create symbolic links named
hash-value.rN. And you should always make sure this directory
contains the appropriate symbolic links. Use the Makefile which
comes with mod_ssl to accomplish this task.
This directive toggles the usage of the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine for proxy. This
is usually used inside a <VirtualHost> section to enable SSL/TLS for proxy
usage in a particular virtual host. By default the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine is
disabled for proxy image both for the main server and all configured virtual hosts.
Пример
<VirtualHost _default_:443>
SSLProxyEngine on
...
</VirtualHost>
This directive sets the all-in-one file where you keep the certificates and
keys used for authentication of the proxy server to remote servers.
This referenced file is simply the concatenation of the various PEM-encoded
certificate files, in order of preference. Use this directive alternatively
or additionally to SSLProxyMachineCertificatePath.
Currently there is no support for encrypted private keys
This directive sets the directory where you keep the certificates and
keys used for authentication of the proxy server to remote servers.
The files in this directory must be PEM-encoded and are accessed through
hash filenames. Additionally, you must create symbolic links named
hash-value.N. And you should always make sure this
directory contains the appropriate symbolic links. Use the Makefile which
comes with mod_ssl to accomplish this task.
Currently there is no support for encrypted private keys
This directive can be used to control the SSL protocol flavors mod_ssl should
use when establishing its server environment for proxy . It will only connect
to servers using one of the provided protocols.
Please refer to SSLProtocol
for additional information.
This directive sets the Certificate verification level for the remote server
Authentication. Notice that this directive can be used both in per-server and
per-directory context. In per-server context it applies to the remote server
authentication process used in the standard SSL handshake when a connection is
established. In per-directory context it forces a SSL renegotation with the
reconfigured remote server verification level after the HTTP request was read but
before the HTTP response is sent.
The following levels are available for level:
none:
no remote server Certificate is required at all
optional:
the remote server may present a valid Certificate
require:
the remote server has to present a valid Certificate
optional_no_ca:
the remote server may present a valid Certificate
but it need not to be (successfully) verifiable.
In practice only levels none and
require are really interesting, because level
optional doesn't work with all servers and level
optional_no_ca is actually against the idea of
authentication (but can be used to establish SSL test pages, etc.)
This directive sets how deeply mod_ssl should verify before deciding that the
remote server does not have a valid certificate. Notice that this directive can be
used both in per-server and per-directory context. In per-server context it
applies to the client authentication process used in the standard SSL
handshake when a connection is established. In per-directory context it forces
a SSL renegotation with the reconfigured remote server verification depth after the
HTTP request was read but before the HTTP response is sent.
The depth actually is the maximum number of intermediate certificate issuers,
i.e. the number of CA certificates which are max allowed to be followed while
verifying the remote server certificate. A depth of 0 means that self-signed
remote server certificates are accepted only, the default depth of 1 means
the remote server certificate can be self-signed or has to be signed by a CA
which is directly known to the server (i.e. the CA's certificate is under
SSLProxyCACertificatePath), etc.
This configures one or more sources for seeding the Pseudo Random Number
Generator (PRNG) in OpenSSL at startup time (context is
startup) and/or just before a new SSL connection is established
(context is connect). This directive can only be used
in the global server context because the PRNG is a global facility.
The following source variants are available:
builtin
This is the always available builtin seeding source. It's usage
consumes minimum CPU cycles under runtime and hence can be always used
without drawbacks. The source used for seeding the PRNG contains of the
current time, the current process id and (when applicable) a randomly
choosen 1KB extract of the inter-process scoreboard structure of Apache.
The drawback is that this is not really a strong source and at startup
time (where the scoreboard is still not available) this source just
produces a few bytes of entropy. So you should always, at least for the
startup, use an additional seeding source.
file:/path/to/source
This variant uses an external file /path/to/source as the
source for seeding the PRNG. When bytes is specified, only the
first bytes number of bytes of the file form the entropy (and
bytes is given to /path/to/source as the first
argument). When bytes is not specified the whole file forms the
entropy (and 0 is given to /path/to/source as
the first argument). Use this especially at startup time, for instance
with an available /dev/random and/or
/dev/urandom devices (which usually exist on modern Unix
derivates like FreeBSD and Linux).
But be careful: Usually /dev/random provides only as
much entropy data as it actually has, i.e. when you request 512 bytes of
entropy, but the device currently has only 100 bytes available two things
can happen: On some platforms you receive only the 100 bytes while on
other platforms the read blocks until enough bytes are available (which
can take a long time). Here using an existing /dev/urandom is
better, because it never blocks and actually gives the amount of requested
data. The drawback is just that the quality of the received data may not
be the best.
On some platforms like FreeBSD one can even control how the entropy is
actually generated, i.e. by which system interrupts. More details one can
find under rndcontrol(8) on those platforms. Alternatively, when
your system lacks such a random device, you can use tool
like EGD
(Entropy Gathering Daemon) and run it's client program with the
exec:/path/to/program/ variant (see below) or use
egd:/path/to/egd-socket (see below).
exec:/path/to/program
This variant uses an external executable
/path/to/program as the source for seeding the
PRNG. When bytes is specified, only the first
bytes number of bytes of its stdout contents
form the entropy. When bytes is not specified, the
entirety of the data produced on stdout form the
entropy. Use this only at startup time when you need a very strong
seeding with the help of an external program (for instance as in
the example above with the truerand utility you can
find in the mod_ssl distribution which is based on the AT&T
truerand library). Using this in the connection context
slows down the server too dramatically, of course. So usually you
should avoid using external programs in that context.
egd:/path/to/egd-socket (Unix only)
This variant uses the Unix domain socket of the
external Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) (see http://www.lothar.com/tech
/crypto/) to seed the PRNG. Use this if no random device exists
on your platform.
This directive specifies a general access requirement which has to be
fulfilled in order to allow access. It's a very powerful directive because the
requirement specification is an arbitrarily complex boolean expression
containing any number of access checks.
The expression must match the following syntax (given as a BNF
grammar notation):
expr ::= "true" | "false"
| "!" expr
| expr "&&" expr
| expr "||" expr
| "(" expr ")"
| comp
comp ::= word "==" word | word "eq" word
| word "!=" word | word "ne" word
| word "<" word | word "lt" word
| word "<=" word | word "le" word
| word ">" word | word "gt" word
| word ">=" word | word "ge" word
| word "in" "{" wordlist "}"
| word "=~" regex
| word "!~" regex
wordlist ::= word
| wordlist "," word
word ::= digit
| cstring
| variable
| function
digit ::= [0-9]+
cstring ::= "..."
variable ::= "%{" varname "}"
function ::= funcname "(" funcargs ")"
while for varname any variable from Table 3 can be used. Finally for
funcname the following functions are available:
file(filename)
This function takes one string argument and expands to the contents of the
file. This is especially useful for matching this contents against a
regular expression, etc.
Notice that expression is first parsed into an internal machine
representation and then evaluated in a second step. Actually, in Global and
Per-Server Class context expression is parsed at startup time and
at runtime only the machine representation is executed. For Per-Directory
context this is different: here expression has to be parsed and
immediately executed for every request.
Пример
SSLRequire ( %{SSL_CIPHER} !~ m/^(EXP|NULL)-/ \
and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O} eq "Snake Oil, Ltd." \
and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU} in {"Staff", "CA", "Dev"} \
and %{TIME_WDAY} >= 1 and %{TIME_WDAY} <= 5 \
and %{TIME_HOUR} >= 8 and %{TIME_HOUR} <= 20 ) \
or %{REMOTE_ADDR} =~ m/^192\.76\.162\.[0-9]+$/
This directive forbids access unless HTTP over SSL (i.e. HTTPS) is enabled for
the current connection. This is very handy inside the SSL-enabled virtual
host or directories for defending against configuration errors that expose
stuff that should be protected. When this directive is present all requests
are denied which are not using SSL.
This configures the storage type of the global/inter-process SSL Session
Cache. This cache is an optional facility which speeds up parallel request
processing. For requests to the same server process (via HTTP keep-alive),
OpenSSL already caches the SSL session information locally. But because modern
clients request inlined images and other data via parallel requests (usually
up to four parallel requests are common) those requests are served by
different pre-forked server processes. Here an inter-process cache
helps to avoid unneccessary session handshakes.
The following two storage types are currently supported:
none
This is the default and just disables the global/inter-process Session
Cache. There is no drawback in functionality, but a noticeable speed
penalty can be observed.
dbm:/path/to/datafile
This makes use of a DBM hashfile on the local disk to synchronize the
local OpenSSL memory caches of the server processes. The slight increase
in I/O on the server results in a visible request speedup for your
clients, so this type of storage is generally recommended.
shm:/path/to/datafile[(size)]
This makes use of a high-performance hash table (approx. size bytes
in size) inside a shared memory segment in RAM (established via
/path/to/datafile) to synchronize the local OpenSSL memory
caches of the server processes. This storage type is not available on all
platforms.
This directive sets the timeout in seconds for the information stored in the
global/inter-process SSL Session Cache and the OpenSSL internal memory cache.
It can be set as low as 15 for testing, but should be set to higher
values like 300 in real life.
This directive sets the "user" field in the Apache request object.
This is used by lower modules to identify the user with a character
string. In particular, this may cause the environment variable
REMOTE_USER to be set. The varname can be
any of the SSL environment variables.
This directive sets the Certificate verification level for the Client
Authentication. Notice that this directive can be used both in per-server and
per-directory context. In per-server context it applies to the client
authentication process used in the standard SSL handshake when a connection is
established. In per-directory context it forces a SSL renegotation with the
reconfigured client verification level after the HTTP request was read but
before the HTTP response is sent.
The following levels are available for level:
none:
no client Certificate is required at all
optional:
the client may present a valid Certificate
require:
the client has to present a valid Certificate
optional_no_ca:
the client may present a valid Certificate
but it need not to be (successfully) verifiable.
In practice only levels none and
require are really interesting, because level
optional doesn't work with all browsers and level
optional_no_ca is actually against the idea of
authentication (but can be used to establish SSL test pages, etc.)
This directive sets how deeply mod_ssl should verify before deciding that the
clients don't have a valid certificate. Notice that this directive can be
used both in per-server and per-directory context. In per-server context it
applies to the client authentication process used in the standard SSL
handshake when a connection is established. In per-directory context it forces
a SSL renegotation with the reconfigured client verification depth after the
HTTP request was read but before the HTTP response is sent.
The depth actually is the maximum number of intermediate certificate issuers,
i.e. the number of CA certificates which are max allowed to be followed while
verifying the client certificate. A depth of 0 means that self-signed client
certificates are accepted only, the default depth of 1 means the client
certificate can be self-signed or has to be signed by a CA which is directly
known to the server (i.e. the CA's certificate is under
SSLCACertificatePath), etc.